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In the federal budget, the portion of refundable credits that reduces the amount of taxes owed is counted 
as a reduction in revenues, and the portion that exceeds people’s tax liabilities is treated as an outlay. 
Since 1975, when the first refundable tax credit took effect, outlays have accounted for between 50 
percent and 80 percent of the annual budgetary costs of refundable tax credits. 
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subsidies provided through the tax system. Starting in 2014, a new refundable tax credit will be available 
to some people for the purchase of health insurance through newly created exchanges. The cost of that 
credit will be about $110 billion by 2021, CBO and the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) 
project, bringing the total cost of refundable tax credits in that year to $213 billion— roughly the same as 
the costs in 2009 and 2010, even though the number of refundable tax credits will have fallen by more 
than half between 2010 and 2021. 
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Notes
Numbers in the text and tables may not add up to totals because of rounding.
Unless otherwise indicated, all years referred to in this study are calendar years. 
Federal tax liabilities are the amount of federal taxes people owe on the basis of their annual 
income, regardless of when the taxes are paid. The portion of refundable tax credits that 
reduces the amount of federal tax liabilities is counted as a reduction in revenue. The portion 
that exceeds people’s tax liabilities is treated as an outlay.
Throughout this report, the costs of refundable tax credits are given in 2013 dollars. The 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) used the price index for personal consumption 
expenditures to convert nominal costs into real (inflation-adjusted) costs. 
Historical data on the effect of most refundable tax credits on the federal budget (including 
the reduction in tax liabilities and the increase in outlays) are based on a sample of tax 
returns. The data are available through 2009 from Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Statistics 
of Income, Individual Income Tax Returns, Publication 1304 (various years), and, for 2010, 
from “SOI Tax Stats - Individual Income Tax Returns Publication 1304 (Complete Report),” 
www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Individual-Income-Tax-Returns-Publication-1304-
(Complete-Report) (December 18, 2012). Data on a refundable tax credit for corporations 
are available through 2009 from IRS, “SOI Tax Stats - Corporation Complete Report,” 
www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Corporation-Complete-Report (November 29, 2012). 
Projections are based on estimates from the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.
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Refundable Tax Credits
Summary
The U.S. tax code contains many preferences that lower 
or eliminate the amount of taxes owed. Those preferences 
include deductions, exclusions, and tax credits, which can 
be either refundable or nonrefundable. Refundable tax 
credits differ from other preferences in a significant way: 
Whereas other preferences reduce the amount of taxes 
owed to the government, refundable credits can result in 
net payments from the government. Specifically, if the 
amount of a refundable tax credit exceeds a filer’s tax lia-
bility before that credit is applied, the government pays 
the excess to that person or business.
In the federal budget, the portion of refundable credits 
that reduces the amount of taxes owed is counted as a 
reduction in revenues, and the portion that exceeds peo-
ple’s tax liabilities is treated as an outlay. Since 1975, 
when the first refundable tax credit took effect, outlays 
have accounted for between 50 percent and 80 percent 
of the annual budgetary costs of refundable tax credits.
The number and total costs of the refundable credits in 
the income tax system have grown considerably since 
1975. The number of credits peaked at 11 in 2010 before 
dropping to 6 in 2013 (see Figure 1). Their total costs 
(that is, the reduction in revenues and the increase in 
outlays) reached a high of $238 billion in 2008. (That 
amount and other annual costs discussed in this report 
are expressed in 2013 dollars.) Those costs will drop to 
$149 billion in 2013, the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) estimates, mostly for the earned income tax credit 
(EITC) and the child tax credit. By 2018, three more 
credits will have expired, and the EITC and the child tax 
credit will have been scaled back.
Those cutbacks in refundable tax credits will be more 
than offset, however, by new health-related subsidies 
provided through the tax system. Starting in 2014, a 
new refundable tax credit will be available to some people 
for the purchase of health insurance through newly 
created exchanges. The cost of that credit will be about 
$110 billion by 2021, CBO and the staff of the Joint 
Committee on Taxation (JCT) project, bringing the total 
cost of refundable tax credits in that year to $213 bil-
lion—roughly the same as the costs in 2009 and 2010, 
even though the number of refundable tax credits will 
have fallen by more than half between 2010 and 2021.
Changing Nature of Refundable Tax Credits
Not only have the number and costs of refundable tax 
credits changed over the years, but the nature of those 
credits has evolved. Eligibility for the first refundable 
tax credit—the earned income tax credit—was based 
primarily on the recipient’s earnings, adjusted gross 
income, and the number of children in his or her home.1 
However, many of the newer refundable tax credits are 
not limited to people with earnings but are instead used 
to compensate people for expenditures on items such as 
health insurance and higher education. Once restricted to 
low-income workers who live with children, eligibility for 
some refundable tax credits has been extended—first to 
workers with very low income who do not live with 
children, then to people who incur certain types of 
expenses but who may not work, and more recently to 
some businesses. 
Effects on the Economy and the Tax System
The growth of refundable credits affects the economy and 
the tax system in several ways. The credits affect:
 Economic efficiency—how resources are allocated in 
the economy; 
 Equity—how tax burdens are allocated among 
households with varying demographic and economic 
characteristics; and
1. Adjusted gross income includes earnings and other taxable 
income (such as investment income), net of exclusions of some 
types of income (tax-exempt interest, for example) and certain 
adjustments.
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 Simplicity of the tax system—what the costs are of 
complying with and administering taxes.
Credits affect the allocation of resources by favoring cer-
tain activities or goods. Credits that decline in value as 
income rises prompt some people to work fewer hours. 
However, credits that increase as earnings rise, such as the 
EITC at certain income levels, provide an incentive for 
some people to work more. The EITC also draws people 
into the labor force by increasing their after-tax income. 
On balance, that latter effect appears to dominate; 
researchers have identified a link between expansions 
of the EITC and increases in the number of people—
especially single mothers—who have entered the 
workforce. 
In addition, the growth of refundable tax credits has 
contributed to a decline in average tax rates among 
households in the bottom 40 percent of the income 
distribution. That decline is most notable for individual 
income tax rates, which between 2007 and 2009 became 
increasingly negative for low-income households (that is, 
on average, those households received money back from 
the federal government instead of owing income taxes). 
Most of those households, however, pay federal payroll 
taxes.
Refundable tax credits also affect the administration of 
taxes. By adding more complicated rules, more tax forms, 
and more computations, the credits increase the costs 
incurred by taxpayers in complying with the tax code and 
by the government in administering those laws.
Administrative Challenges in Providing Subsidies
Most refundable tax credits were created to meet social 
policy goals, such as providing income support for low-
income households, expanding health insurance coverage, 
or increasing college enrollment. But those goals could 
instead be pursued through spending programs, such 
as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
(formerly known as the Food Stamp program), the 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program, 
Medicaid, the Children’s Health Insurance Program, 
and the Pell Grant program. 
The choice between using the tax system and relying on 
spending programs to meet such goals hinges largely on 
administrative considerations, such as the effectiveness 
in reaching the target population, timeliness, and the 
ability to ensure compliance with rules. Each of those 
considerations affects the costs incurred by the federal
Figure 1.
Number and Total Costs of 
Refundable Tax Credits, 
Calendar Years 1975 to 2021
Sources: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and estimates from the 
staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation. Historical data 
for refundable tax credits that are reported on individual 
tax returns are available through 2009 from IRS, 
Individual Income Tax Returns, Publication 1304 (various 
years), and, for 2010, from “SOI Tax Stats - Individual 
Income Tax Returns Publication 1304 (Complete 
Report),” www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Individual
-Income-Tax-Returns-Publication-1304-(Complete
-Report) (December 18, 2012). Historical data for the 
refundable tax credit for corporations—the prior-year 
alternative minimum tax credit—are available through 
2009 from IRS, “SOI Tax Stats - Corporation Complete 
Report,” www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Corporation
-Complete-Report (November 29, 2012).
Note: The costs of credits that switch from refundable to 
nonrefundable status (or vice versa) are shown only for the 
period in which they are refundable.
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government and the burdens imposed on people who are 
eligible for benefits and on the third parties who might be 
asked to provide evidence of applicants’ eligibility. Mini-
mizing those costs and burdens, then, can be a factor in 
deciding between the tax system and spending programs 
as a means to deliver subsidies.
Delivering assistance to low-income families using either 
approach has advantages and disadvantages. In some 
cases, it is simpler to distribute assistance to low-income 
workers through the tax system: Most of those workers 
already file tax returns to claim refunds of income taxes 
withheld during the year even if they do not owe any 
taxes, and they can generally claim a credit by attaching 
one more form to their return. By comparison, claiming 
assistance through spending programs can be more time-
consuming and intrusive for beneficiaries, especially 
if they must take time off from work to apply for the 
benefit in person at a government agency. But spending 
programs can more easily reach people who do not have 
to file tax returns and who are already receiving certain 
benefits from other government agencies. In many 
instances, caseworkers attached to those programs assist 
claimants by determining eligibility for them.
The two approaches differ in other ways. Spending pro-
grams can be designed to provide assistance as the need 
arises, whereas people typically file tax returns only 
once a year, which makes it more challenging to provide 
timely assistance during the year. Overpayments are gen-
erally higher for refundable tax credits than for subsidies 
operated through spending programs, primarily because 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) cannot verify that 
applicants meet all eligibility requirements before benefits 
are paid. However, additional verification steps raise 
the administrative and compliance costs of spending 
programs relative to those of the tax system.
Transparency of Refundable Tax Credits 
Some analysts have suggested that the scope of federal 
budgetary commitments is masked because as much as 
half of the cost of all refundable tax credits (as well as the 
full costs of other tax preferences) has been recorded as a 
reduction in revenues, thereby making the budget appear 
smaller. Moreover, those preferences are not displayed in 
separate accounts in the budget in the same manner as 
spending programs. Only the outlay portion of each 
refundable tax credit is easily identified in the budget in a 
separate line item. The remaining costs are not presented 
individually; they are, instead, reflected in the total 
amount of revenues recorded. That presentation makes 
the readily identifiable budgetary costs of refundable 
tax credits appear smaller than the full costs of those 
credits. As a result, providing Congressional review 
and oversight is more difficult for the credits than for 
spending programs.
The Structure of Tax Preferences
The preferences in the U.S. tax code that reduce or, in 
some cases, eliminate a taxpayer’s income tax liability 
can take the form of exclusions, deductions, or credits, 
each of which affects the calculation of tax liabilities in 
a different way: 
 A tax exclusion reduces the amount of income that tax 
filers report on their tax return.
 A tax deduction is an expense that is reported on tax 
returns and then subtracted from reported income 
when calculating taxable income.2 
 A nonrefundable tax credit offsets an individual’s tax 
liability, reducing it dollar for dollar. 
 A refundable tax credit also offsets tax liabilities, but 
eligible individuals and businesses receive the full 
amount of the credit even if they do not have any tax 
to offset. As a result, they receive money back from the 
government, on net, rather than owing taxes.
Whereas tax credits reduce the amount of taxes owed 
dollar for dollar, exclusions and deductions reduce tax 
liabilities by less than the amount reported on the tax 
return. Because exclusions and deductions lower taxable 
income, their net impact generally depends on a tax-
payer’s marginal tax rate (the rate that applies to the last 
2. The tax code gives taxpayers a choice between itemizing deduc-
tions for certain specified expenses, such as state and local income 
taxes and mortgage interest, and claiming the standard deduction, 
which is a flat dollar amount that does not depend on the actual 
amount spent. Generally, taxpayers find it more advantageous to 
itemize deductions if the sum of those deductions is greater than 
the standard deduction. The standard deduction or itemized 
deductions are subtracted from adjusted gross income when calcu-
lating taxable income. Some deductions—for, example, the one 
for contributions to an individual retirement account—can be 
claimed by any eligible taxpayer, even if he or she also claims the 
standard deduction; such preferences are sometimes referred to as 
“above-the-line” deductions and are subtracted from total income 
to compute adjusted gross income. 
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Table 1.
Illustrative Effects of Alternative Tax Preferences on Tax Liabilities
(Dollars, unless otherwise specified)
Continued
dollar of income).3 Hence, as tax rates increase, so does 
the value of tax exclusions and deductions. For example, 
a person who is in the 25 percent tax bracket and deducts 
payments of $14,000 for, say, home mortgage interest 
reduces his or her tax liability by $3,500, but that 
reduction increases to $4,900 for a homeowner in the 
35 percent bracket (see Table 1, which illustrates the 
effect of tax preferences on the amount of taxes owed). 
By contrast, a nonrefundable tax credit directly reduces 
the filer’s income tax liability, meaning that the benefit 
received is simply equal to the amount of the credit but is 
not to exceed the filer’s tax liability. Thus, an individual 
who is in the 25 percent tax bracket and has $14,000 of
Taxable Income 
Before deduction for qualifying expense 80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000
Minus deduction n.a. -14,000 n.a. n.a.______ ______ ______ ______
After deduction 80,000 66,000 80,000 80,000
Tax Rate (Percent)a 25 25 25 25
Tax Liability 
Before credit for qualifying expense 20,000 16,500 20,000 20,000
Minus amount of credit that reduces tax liability n.a. n.a. -3,500 -3,500______ ______ ______ ______
After credit 20,000 16,500 16,500 16,500
  
Amount of Credit That Exceeds Tax Liability n.a. n.a. n.a. 0
Change from Scenario with No Tax Preference
Reduction in tax liability n.a. 3,500 3,500 3,500
Payment from government n.a. 0 0 0_____ _____ _____
Income after taxes and government payments n.a. 3,500 3,500 3,500
  
Taxable Income 
Before deduction for qualifying expense 250,000 250,000 250,000 250,000
Minus deduction 0 -14,000 0 0_______ _______ _______ _______
After deduction 250,000 236,000 250,000 250,000
Tax Rate (Percent)a 35 35 35 35
Tax Liability 
Before credit for qualifying expense 87,500 82,600 87,500 87,500
Minus amount of credit that reduces tax liability n.a. n.a. -3,500 -3,500______ ______ ______ ______
After credit 87,500 82,600 84,000 84,000
  
Amount of Credit That Exceeds Tax Liability n.a. n.a. n.a. 0
Change from Scenario with No Tax Preference
Reduction in tax liability n.a. 4,900 3,500 3,500
Payment from government n.a. 0 0 0_____ _____ _____
Income after taxes and government payments n.a. 4,900 3,500 3,500
No Tax
Tax Rate = 35 Percent
Tax Rate = 25 Percent
Preference $14,000
Deduction of
Nonrefundable Refundable 
Tax Credit of $3,500
3. As income rises, the value of some tax preferences declines—and 
is eventually eliminated—because of special phaseout rules. For 
simplicity, the discussion in this section ignores phaseout rules.
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Table 1. Continued
Illustrative Effects of Alternative Tax Preferences on Tax Liabilities
(Dollars, unless otherwise specified)
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Notes: For simplicity, the amounts of the deduction and tax credits are the same in each set of examples. Taxable income is equal to 
adjusted gross income, net of deductions and exemptions. Adjusted gross income includes earnings and other taxable income (such 
as investment income), net of exclusions of some types of income (tax-exempt interest, for example) and certain adjustments. The 
starting point in the examples assumes that all deductions and exemptions—other than the tax preference for the illustrative 
qualifying expense—have already been subtracted from adjusted gross income.
n.a. = not applicable.
a. For simplicity, the same tax rate is assumed to apply to the entire amount of the individual’s income.
mortgage interest payments would generally benefit 
equally from a $3,500 tax credit (for example, a credit 
equal to 25 percent of mortgage interest) or a deduction 
of the full amount of those interest payments. 
Unlike the value of exclusions and deductions, the dollar 
value of a nonrefundable tax credit is not affected by one’s 
income and tax bracket, as long as the person’s tax liabil-
ity (before the credit) is greater than the amount of the 
credit. As a result, a person in the 35 percent bracket 
would prefer a $14,000 deduction to a $3,500 tax credit 
because the deduction would provide that person with 
$1,400 more in tax benefits than would the credit. 
The value of exclusions, deductions, and nonrefundable 
tax credits is limited, however, by the amount of taxes a 
person owes. People generally do not have any income tax 
liability (before credits) if their income is below a certain 
amount—about $27,100 for a family with two children 
(or about 120 percent of the federal poverty guideline for 
a family that size) and about $9,800 for an individual 
with no children (about 90 percent of the poverty guide-
line for a one-person family) in 2012.4 A person who is 
eligible for a $3,500 nonrefundable credit and owes the 
IRS $3,000 in income taxes can claim the credit only 
up to the amount equaling his or her tax liability—in 
this case, $3,000 (see, for example, the person in the 
15 percent tax bracket in Table 1). 
Refundable tax credits differ from other tax preferences in 
that their value may exceed the amount of income taxes 
the filer owes. The person in the previous example 
Taxable Income 
Before deduction for qualifying expense 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000
Minus deduction 0 -14,000 0 0______ ______ ______ ______
After deduction 20,000 6,000 20,000 20,000
Tax Rate (Percent)a 15 15 15 15
Tax Liability 
Before credit for qualifying expense 3,000 900 3,000 3,000
Minus amount of credit that reduces tax liability n.a. n.a. -3,000 -3,000_____ ____ _____ _____
After credit 3,000 900 0 0
 
Amount of Credit That Exceeds Tax Liability n.a. n.a. n.a. 500
Change from Scenario with No Tax Preference
Reduction in tax liability n.a. 2,100 3,000 3,000
Payment from government n.a. 0 0 500_____ _____ _____
Income after taxes and government payments n.a. 2,100 3,000 3,500
  
Preference $14,000 Nonrefundable Refundable 
Tax Rate = 15 Percent
No Tax Deduction of Tax Credit of $3,500
4. The income tax thresholds in this example reflect the standard 
deduction and personal exemptions (for taxpayers and their 
dependents) available to each family or individual in 2012. 
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(eligible for a $3,500 credit and owing $3,000 in income 
taxes) could claim the full $3,500 if the credit was 
refundable, even though that amount exceeded (by $500) 
the amount of taxes owed. In that case, on net, the gov-
ernment would pay the individual rather than the other 
way around. Lawmakers sometimes place limits on the 
amount of the credit a person can receive if he or she does 
not have any income tax liability; in those instances, the 
credits are referred to as partially refundable.
Costs of Refundable Tax Credits
The first refundable credit was established in 1975, and 
the number of those credits began increasing in 1998; 
11 different credits were in place in 2010. The costs of 
refundable tax credits peaked in 2008 but declined over 
the next four years because of the expiration of several 
credits designed to provide temporary economic stimu-
lus. Costs will begin to climb again after 2013, CBO 
projects, and, by 2017, they will be about the same 
($238 billion) as in 2008 (see Figure 2). In 2018, when 
several credits are scaled back or eliminated, costs will 
fall by more than 10 percent, and, for the remainder of 
the decade, they will hover around $210 billion—about 
the same as the cost in 2010, even though only four 
refundable credits will be in effect after 2017.
Sharp Increase in Costs from 1975 to 2010
The first refundable tax credit—the earned income tax 
credit—was introduced in 1975 and had a total budget-
ary cost in that year of nearly $5 billion. That cost 
included both the reduction in revenues (the portion of 
the credit used to reduce tax liability) and the increase in 
outlays (the portion of the credit that exceeds tax liabili-
ties and is paid to the taxpayer). The costs of refundable 
tax credits reached $109 billion in 2007 and then shot 
up to $238 billion in 2008, when eight such credits were 
in effect. By 2010, the total cost had dropped to about 
$209 billion—still nearly twice the cost in 2007. The 
surge in the number and cost of refundable credits 
between 2007 and 2010 occurred largely because of the 
recession, which led to the enactment of temporary new 
credits and the expansion of existing ones.5 Although the 
number of credits increased from 2008 to 2010, their 
costs were greater in 2008 largely because of the one-time 
economic stimulus payments that were enacted in the 
Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 (which defined them 
as refundable tax credits) and were received by most 
taxpayers in that year (see Figure 3).6 
In 1975, over two-thirds of the credits’ costs was from the 
refundable portion of the credits (the amount by which 
credits exceed tax liabilities) and thus was counted in the 
federal budget as an outlay. That share peaked at 80 per-
cent in 1996 after the value of the EITC, which is 
directed toward lower-income workers, was substantially 
increased in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993 (referred to in this report as the 1993 reconciliation 
act). It then fell to about 50 percent in 2008 after enact-
ment of the economic stimulus payments, which, like the 
EITC, provided assistance to workers but which extended 
eligibility for that credit to people who had higher 
income and were more likely to owe taxes before taking 
that credit. 
Declining Costs from 2010 to 2013
Most of the expansions of the credits that were enacted 
after 2007, along with temporary reductions in the 
individual income tax rates and other tax cuts, were 
scheduled to expire by the end of 2010. The Tax Relief, 
Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job 
Creation Act of 2010 (referred to in this report as the 
2010 tax act) extended most of those tax provisions 
(along with the credit expansions enacted in the Eco-
nomic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 
2001) for two more years; the American Taxpayer Relief 
Act of 2012 extended those provisions for at least five 
more years. However the 2010 act allowed other credits, 
such as the Making Work Pay credit, to expire (see 
Figure 4 on page 9).
5. Recessions affect the costs of refundable tax credits even in the 
absence of legislation that expands the scope of the credits. How-
ever, those effects are not easy to identify because recessions affect 
eligibility for credits in two different directions. Declines in 
income make some people, whose income was previously above 
the cutoff for a credit, eligible for certain credits. However, other 
people will no longer qualify for a credit because, for example, 
their earnings drop to zero (in the case of the earned income tax 
credit) or they can no longer afford (even with a subsidy) the item 
that is favored by the tax incentive. 
6. Most people received the credit in 2008 on the basis of informa-
tion provided on their 2007 tax returns. Taxpayers who did not 
file 2007 tax returns had a second opportunity to receive the eco-
nomic stimulus payment: They could claim the credit on their 
2008 tax returns. (The credit was referred to as a “recovery rebate” 
on the 2008 return.) In this analysis, CBO counted the credits 
received in 2008 and in 2009 as offsets to 2008 tax liabilities.
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Figure 2.
Costs of Refundable Tax Credits and the Key Legislation That Affected Them, 
Calendar Years 1975 to 2021
(Billions of 2013 dollars)
Sources: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and estimates from the staff of the Joint 
Committee on Taxation. Historical data for refundable tax credits that are reported on individual tax returns are available through 
2009 from IRS, Individual Income Tax Returns, Publication 1304 (various years), and, for 2010, from “SOI Tax Stats - Individual 
Income Tax Returns Publication 1304 (Complete Report),” www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Individual-Income-Tax-Returns
-Publication-1304-(Complete-Report) (December 18, 2012). Historical data for the refundable tax credit for corporations—the 
prior-year alternative minimum tax credit—are available through 2009 from IRS, “SOI Tax Stats - Corporation Complete Report,” 
www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Corporation-Complete-Report (November 29, 2012).
Notes: In the federal budget, the portion of refundable credits that is used to reduce the amount of taxes owed is counted as a reduction in 
revenues, and the portion that exceeds tax liabilities (the refundable portion) is treated as an outlay.
The costs of credits that switch from refundable to nonrefundable status (or vice versa) are shown only for the period in which 
they are refundable. The American Opportunity Tax Credit is refundable from 2009 to 2017 and nonrefundable (as the Hope credit) 
before and after those years. The prior-year alternative minimum tax credit for individuals was refundable from 2007 to 2012 and 
nonrefundable before and after. The adoption tax credit was refundable in 2010 and 2011 and nonrefundable before and after.
EITC = earned income tax credit; CTC = child tax credit.
By the beginning of 2013, five of the refundable tax 
credits that were available in 2010 had expired. Hence, 
according to CBO’s projections, the budgetary costs of 
refundable tax credits will drop from $209 billion in 
2010 to $149 billion in 2013.7 Because most of that 
decline in costs will be reflected in the budget as a smaller 
reduction in revenues, the share of total costs recorded as 
outlays will rise from 54 percent to 65 percent. That out-
come is due largely to the expiration of the Making Work 
Pay credit, which was available to higher-income people 
who owe taxes. The EITC will be the largest remaining 
refundable tax credit; its budgetary costs will total an esti-
mated $68 billion in 2013, of which $60 billion will be 
payments that exceed tax liabilities and will be recorded 
in the budget as outlays. 
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7. CBO’s projections incorporate the effects of the American 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012.
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Figure 3.
Costs of Refundable Tax Credits, Calendar Years 2007, 2008, and 2010
(Billions of 2013 dollars)
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Historical data for refundable tax credits that are 
reported on individual tax returns are available through 2009 from IRS, Individual Income Tax Returns, Publication 1304 (various 
years), and, for 2010, from “SOI Tax Stats - Individual Income Tax Returns Publication 1304 (Complete Report),” www.irs.gov/uac/
SOI-Tax-Stats-Individual-Income-Tax-Returns-Publication-1304-(Complete-Report) (December 18, 2012). Historical data for the 
refundable tax credit for corporations—the prior-year alternative minimum tax credit—are available through 2009 from IRS, “SOI 
Tax Stats - Corporation Complete Report,” www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Corporation-Complete-Report (November 29, 2012).
Note: In the federal budget, the portion of refundable credits that is used to reduce the amount of taxes owed is counted as a reduction in 
revenues, and the portion that exceeds tax liabilities (the refundable portion) is treated as an outlay.
Rising Costs After 2013
That drop in the total cost of refundable credits will be 
partially reversed when the refundable tax credit for 
health insurance premiums, enacted in 2010 in the 
Affordable Care Act, takes effect in 2014.8 Low- and 
moderate-income individuals and families will become 
eligible for refundable tax credits that reduce the cost of 
health insurance purchased through the new health insur-
ance exchanges.9 CBO and JCT estimate that the credit 
will add $35 billion to the costs of all credits in 2014 (see 
Table 2).
The total costs of refundable tax credits will continue to 
climb through 2017, when they will reach a high of 
$238 billion—about the same as the previous peak in 
2008. However, those costs will fall in 2018 when the 
American Opportunity Tax Credit expires and the child 
tax credit and the EITC are scaled back. 
In 2021, the refundable tax credit for health insurance 
premiums will be the largest refundable tax credit. CBO 
and JCT estimate that the credit will cost $110 billion in 
that year, about three-quarters of which will be attribut-
able to an increase in outlays. As a result, CBO estimates, 
Other
American Opportunity Tax Credit
Making Work Pay Credit
Child Tax Credit
Earned Income Tax Credit
Other
Economic Stimulus Payments
Child Tax Credit
Earned Income Tax Credit
Other
Child Tax Credit
Earned Income Tax Credit
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Outlays Reduction in Revenues
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8. The Affordable Care Act refers to the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, the amendments made to the law by the 
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, and related legis-
lative changes since those laws were enacted. In addition to the 
credits for health insurance premiums, the Affordable Care Act 
also established a tax credit for small businesses that took effect 
in 2010. 
9. Health insurance exchanges will be established to link people 
with insurance plans and to enroll eligible applicants in qualifying 
health insurance plans. The exchanges will also play a substantial 
role in administering the refundable tax credits for health 
insurance premiums. 
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Figure 4.
Years in Which Tax Credits Are Refundable
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Notes: Date labels refer to the beginning of the calendar year. Most refundable credits took effect on January 1 and expired on December 31 
of the applicable year. For credits that took effect or expired on different dates, see Table A-1.
COBRA = Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act.
a. The original legislation also allowed corporations to claim a refundable research credit under certain circumstances. That provision 
expired on December 31, 2009.
the costs of refundable tax credits will total $213 billion 
in 2021—roughly the same amount as in 2010, when the 
tax code contained seven more refundable tax credits. 
The proportion of those costs categorized as outlays will 
rise from 65 percent in 2013 to an estimated 71 percent 
in 2021. None of the refundable tax credits that will be 
available in 2021 are scheduled to expire.
The Evolution of 
Refundable Tax Credits
The nature of refundable tax credits has evolved during 
the past decade. Initially, only workers who resided with 
children were eligible for the EITC, and the amount of 
the credit was tied to earnings. Since 1975, lawmakers 
have increased the amount of the EITC and extended 
eligibility to workers farther up the income scale and to 
those who do not live with children. In addition, more 
credits have been created, most of which are linked to 
expenditures on specific goods or services rather than 
to earnings, and one of the newer credits is available to 
certain types of businesses rather than to individuals or 
families (see the appendix).
Earnings-Based Credits 
The enactment of the earned income tax credit in 1975 
signaled a change in federal tax policy: People could 
receive benefits through the tax system even if those 
benefits exceeded the amount of taxes they owed. The 
concept of a refundable tax credit, however, was not new. 
The merits and disadvantages of a negative income tax, 
which would have provided low-income families with a 
grant (or guaranteed payment) through the tax system 
even if they did not owe any income taxes, were debated 
during the 1960s. The amount of such a grant would be 
smaller for people with higher income. At a certain 
income level, the grant would be eliminated, and a family 
would be required to pay the full tax. Although such a 
program would have provided support for low-income 
families, some lawmakers were concerned that the 
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Premium Assistance Tax Credit
Small Business Health Care Tax Credit
Adoption Tax Credit
Making Work Pay Credit
American Opportunity Tax Credit
First-Time Homebuyer Credit
COBRA Premium Assistance Credit
Economic Stimulus Payments
Prior-Year Alternative Minimum Tax Credit—Corporations
a
Prior-Year Alternative Minimum Tax Credit—Individuals
Health Coverage Tax Credit
Child Tax Credit
Earned Income Tax Credit
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Table 2.
Costs of Refundable Tax Credits in Calendar Years 2013, 2014, and 2021
(Billions of 2013 dollars)
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on estimates from the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.
Note: * = between zero and $500 million.
promise of a guaranteed payment would discourage some 
people from working.10 
The EITC established a different model for targeting 
assistance toward low-income families through the tax 
system. Unlike the negative income tax, the EITC was 
available only to people who were employed at some 
point during the year. Moreover, the credit—which rose 
by 10 cents for each dollar of earnings—effectively com-
pensated workers for most of the additional payroll taxes 
they and their employers would pay on added earnings.11 
In that way, the credit was designed to offset the work 
disincentives created by the payroll tax. 
But another feature of the EITC had an opposing effect 
on people’s decisions to work. When it was established, 
the amount of the credit began to fall once it reached a 
maximum of $400 a year; the decline in the amount of 
the credit as income rose, after a certain point, boosted 
the marginal tax rate on added earnings. In addition, the 
credit was limited to workers who lived with children 
(who met certain age, relationship, and residency tests); 
that limit was imposed because of concerns that such 
people faced larger hurdles to work—such as the incen-
tives to work less embedded in welfare programs—than 
did other low-income people.12 
Since 1975, the credit rates for workers with children 
have increased, keeping pace, at times, with the rise in 
payroll tax rates during the 1980s. Provisions in the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 expanded 
the EITC by increasing the credit rate above the rate for 
payroll taxes and, for the first time, setting the credit at a 
higher rate for workers with two or more children. The 
1993 reconciliation act further increased and expanded 
the credit, especially by boosting the amount received by 
larger families. With those changes, the goals of the EITC 
included assisting families with the costs of raising chil-
dren and reducing poverty among full-time workers. 
Concern about the impact of higher gasoline taxes on 
low-income workers led to the addition of a small credit 
under the 1993 reconciliation act for workers who did 
not live with children.
The EITC remained the only refundable credit in the 
federal tax code until the child tax credit was enacted in 
1997 in the Taxpayer Relief Act, allowing eligible families 
to claim a tax credit of up to $400 (rising to $500 in 
Credit
Earned Income Tax Credit 68 68 61
Child Tax Credit 57 57 40
Health Coverage Tax Credit * 0 0
Prior-Year Alternative Minimum Tax Credit—Corporations * 0 0
American Opportunity Tax Credit 21 21 0
Small Business Health Care Tax Credit 2 3 2
Premium Assistance Tax Credit 0 35 110___ ___ ____
Total 149 184 213
2013 2014 2021
10. See Dennis J. Ventry Jr., “The Collision of Tax and Welfare 
Politics: The Political History of the Earned Income Tax Credit,” 
in Bruce D. Meyer and Douglas Holtz-Eakin, eds., Making Work 
Pay: The Earned Income Tax Credit and Its Impact on America’s 
Families (Russell Sage Foundation, 2002), pp. 15–66,
www.russellsage.org/publications/making-work-pay.
11. At that time, employees and employers each paid 5.85 percent of 
earnings in Social Security and Medicare taxes, for a combined 
rate of nearly 12 percent. Economists generally agree that the 
employer’s share of the payroll tax is passed on to workers in the 
form of lower wages. 
12. See House Committee on Ways and Means, Tax Reduction Act of 
1975, Report 94-19 (February 25, 1975); and Senate Committee 
on Finance, Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Report 94-36 (March 12, 
1975). 
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1999) for each dependent under the age of 17.13 The 
credit was reduced—and eventually phased out—
once income exceeded $75,000 for single people and 
$110,000 for married couples filing jointly. Unlike the 
EITC, the child tax credit was not fully refundable. 
Specifically, lawmakers reinforced the link between 
refundable tax credits and payroll taxes by limiting the 
refundable amount (referred to in the tax code as the 
additional child tax credit) to the employee’s share of 
Social Security and Medicare payroll taxes that had not 
been offset by the EITC. Only taxpayers with three or 
more children qualified for the additional amount. 
A series of tax acts, beginning with the Economic Growth 
and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), 
expanded the child tax credit and the EITC. By 2004, the 
child tax credit had increased to $1,000 for each qualify-
ing child, and all filers—including those with one or two 
children—were allowed to receive a payment from the 
government for the portion of the credit that was not 
used to offset income taxes. The amount of that payment 
was 15 percent of earned income in excess of a threshold 
($10,750), up to the maximum credit of $1,000 per 
child. Some married couples also benefited from an 
increase in the EITC.
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(ARRA) further expanded the two earnings-based credits. 
ARRA reduced the earned income threshold for the child 
tax credit to $3,000, thus increasing the number of eligi-
ble workers.14 Also in 2009, the EITC was increased 
again for some married couples, and workers with three 
or more children were allowed a larger credit than those 
with smaller families. In 2013, the maximum EITC 
ranges from $487 for a worker who either has no children 
or who does not live with his or her children to $6,044 
for a worker who lives with three or more children; 
families with income of up to nearly $52,000 are eligible 
for at least a portion of the credit. 
Like other provisions originally enacted in EGTRRA and 
ARRA, the expansions and increases of the child tax 
credit and the EITC were initially scheduled to expire on 
December 31, 2010, but the 2010 tax act extended them 
for two more years. Under the American Taxpayer Relief 
Act of 2012, the changes to the credits that were enacted 
in EGTRRA became permanent features of the tax code. 
However, the 2012 act extended the ARRA provisions 
only through the end of 2017.
Intended to bolster the economy during the recent reces-
sion, the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 and ARRA in 
2009 created temporary refundable tax credits that were 
linked to earnings: respectively, economic stimulus 
payments in 2008 (which were defined by law to be 
refundable tax credits) and the Making Work Pay credit 
(in effect in 2009 and 2010). The maximum stimulus 
payment for single filers was set at $300 in 2008; single 
filers could receive a Making Work Pay credit of up to 
$400 in the following two years.15 (The maximum 
amount of the credits for married couples filing jointly 
was twice that of single filers.) Under both acts, the new 
credits gradually phased out as income rose, beginning at 
$75,000 for single filers and $150,000 for joint filers. 
Those credits were not extended beyond their scheduled 
expiration (at the end of 2008 for the economic stimulus 
payments and at the end of 2010 for the Making Work 
Pay credit), leaving only two earnings-based refundable 
credits in effect in 2013—the EITC and the child tax 
credit.13. The child tax credit differed from the EITC in that the child 
initially did not have to live with the taxpayer to qualify him or 
her for the child tax credit. The American Jobs Creation Act of 
2004 consolidated the rules for claiming children for the two tax 
credits by establishing similar residency and relationship tests for 
child-related tax benefits. The definitions, however, are still not 
uniform. The parent who does not live with his or her young 
child, for example, can receive the child tax credit if the custodial 
parent waives his or her right to do so. However, only the 
custodial parent can claim that child to receive the EITC.
14. The threshold was originally adjusted for changes in the cost of 
living each year. When such an adjustment is made, the number 
of people eligible for the refundable portion of the credit drops if 
earnings grow more slowly than consumer prices. ARRA elimi-
nated the cost-of-living adjustment, which further contributed 
to an increase in the number of eligible workers.
15. The 2008 economic stimulus payments differed from the Making 
Work Pay credit in several other ways. First, the economic stimu-
lus legislation provided a larger nonrefundable credit to taxpayers 
(including those who did not have any earnings) who had a posi-
tive income tax liability before the credit: In those instances, the 
maximum amount of the credit was $600 if single and $1,200 if 
married and filing jointly. Second, the 2008 payments were $300 
higher for each qualifying child under the age of 17. Another dif-
ference—and a departure from previous earnings-based credits—
was the extension of the 2008 economic stimulus payments 
to people who were not currently in the workforce but who 
received Social Security or veterans’ benefits. A similar subsidy 
was provided by ARRA, but those payments were generally made 
by agencies other than the IRS. 
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Expenditure-Based Tax Credits 
As the number of refundable tax credits has increased, 
their nature has changed, especially since 2008. Refund-
able tax credits have become more restrictive in some 
ways and more expansive in others. Unlike the earlier 
credits, which provided cash assistance without any 
restrictions on how those funds were used, many of the 
newer refundable tax credits are available to low- and 
moderate-income people who purchase a particular type 
of good or service (such as health insurance), regardless 
of whether they work. 
The first major step toward expenditure-based credits 
was a supplement to the EITC, enacted in 1990, that 
covered a portion of the costs of health insurance for 
children whose parents worked.16 The size of that supple-
ment, however, was—like the basic EITC—largely 
determined by the worker’s earnings and adjusted gross 
income but was capped at the lesser of the cost of the 
insurance or $428. (In this report, the costs of the supple-
ment are included in the total costs of the EITC and 
other earnings-based credits.) 
Although that supplemental credit was repealed in 1993, 
four other refundable tax credits have since been enacted 
to subsidize the costs of health insurance: 
 The health coverage tax credit, which took effect in 
2002, for households who are eligible for trade adjust-
ment assistance (the federal program that provides 
income support, training, and employment services to 
workers who have lost their job because of trade with 
foreign countries) or who have a pension plan that has 
been taken over by the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation;
 The COBRA (Consolidated Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act) premium assistance credit, which 
took effect in 2008, for workers who lost their job 
between September 2008 and May 2010;
 The small business health care tax credit, which took 
effect in 2010 and which covers a portion of small 
businesses’ payments for their employees’ health 
insurance; and
 The premium assistance tax credit, which will take 
effect in 2014 and will subsidize the purchase of 
health insurance for some people through the newly 
established insurance exchanges.
In addition, several of the newer credits are related to 
other expenses incurred by families, such as the costs of 
buying a home (the first-time homebuyer credit), college 
tuition (the American Opportunity Tax Credit), and 
adoption fees.
In 2010, 8 of the 11 refundable credits were linked to 
expenditures, but those 8 credits represented only about 
11 percent of the outlays attributable to refundable cred-
its. Over the next decade, however, the cost of credits 
based on expenditures will grow much faster than the cost 
of those based on earnings, CBO estimates, and, by 
2021, they will account for 55 percent of outlays for 
refundable tax credits (see Figure 5). 
Nearly all of that growth will be due to the newly enacted 
credit for health insurance purchased through exchanges, 
beginning in 2014. Most people who purchase health 
insurance through an exchange will receive a refundable 
tax credit for their premiums as a result of the Affordable 
Care Act.17 To qualify, individuals and families must have 
income between 100 percent and 400 percent of the fed-
eral poverty guideline. Generally, people who are eligible 
for employment-based health insurance, Medicare, or 
Medicaid will not be able to claim the credit. The credit 
will equal the difference between a reference premium 
and a specified percentage of income, initially ranging
16. Before 1990, the tax code contained a very small expenditure-
based tax credit that was refundable for just one year. The Energy 
Tax Act of 1978 allowed businesses, beginning in 1979, to claim a 
refundable tax credit for investments in solar or wind property 
(equipment that uses solar or wind energy to heat or cool, to pro-
vide hot water, or to generate electricity). Few businesses claimed 
the refundable portion of the credit, however, and the cost of the 
refundable portion was less than $50 million in 1979. The credit 
was made nonrefundable in 1980 and is not counted among the 
refundable credits in this report. 
17. In addition, individuals and families with income between 
100 percent and 250 percent of the federal poverty guideline 
who purchase insurance through an exchange will be eligible for 
cost-sharing assistance to reduce their out-of-pocket costs. Unlike 
premium assistance credits, those subsidies will not be provided 
through the tax system.
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Figure 5.
Outlays for Earnings-Based and 
Expenditure-Based Refundable Tax 
Credits, Calendar Years 1975 to 2021
(Billions of 2013 dollars)
Sources: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and estimates from the 
staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation. Historical data 
for refundable tax credits that are reported on individual 
tax returns are available through 2009 from IRS, 
Individual Income Tax Returns, Publication 1304 (various 
years), and, for 2010, from “SOI Tax Stats - Individual 
Income Tax Returns Publication 1304 (Complete 
Report),” www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Individual
-Income-Tax-Returns-Publication-1304-(Complete
-Report) (December 18, 2012). Historical data for the 
refundable tax credit for corporations—the prior-year 
alternative minimum tax credit—are available through 
2009 from IRS, “SOI Tax Stats - Corporation Complete 
Report,” www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Corporation
-Complete-Report (November 29, 2012).
Notes: In the federal budget, the portion of refundable credits that 
exceeds tax liabilities is treated as an outlay. The portion of 
those credits that reduces the amount of taxes owed is 
counted as a reduction in revenues. This figure shows only 
the outlay amounts.
The costs of credits that switch from refundable to 
nonrefundable status (or vice versa) are shown only for 
the period in which they are refundable. The American 
Opportunity Tax Credit is refundable from 2009 to 2017 and 
nonrefundable (as the Hope credit) before and after those 
years. The adoption tax credit was refundable in 2010 and 
2011 and nonrefundable before and after.
from 2.0 percent to 9.5 percent.18 Only two other 
expenditure-based refundable tax credits will remain 
after 2013—the small business health care tax credit and 
the American Opportunity Tax Credit. The latter credit, 
however, has been extended only through 2017.
Credits Related to the Alternative Minimum Tax 
Some of the more recent credits have extended eligibility 
in new directions.19 Two refundable credits were extended 
to individuals and businesses that paid the alternative 
minimum tax (AMT) in earlier years. Under the AMT, 
federal tax liability is computed differently than it is 
under the regular tax because the AMT allows a more 
limited set of deductions and tax credits; taxpayers pay 
the higher of their regular tax or the AMT. One example 
of the difference between the two taxes is that taxpayers 
can defer income taxes on some forms of income solely 
under the regular tax. However, AMT liabilities that 
result from the deferral provisions generate a nonrefund-
able tax credit (known as the prior-year alternative 
minimum tax credit) that taxpayers can apply to the 
regular income tax they owe in a future year in which 
they are not subject to the AMT. The Tax Relief and 
Health Care Act of 2006 allowed individuals to claim a 
portion of their unused prior-year AMT credits as a 
refundable credit from 2007 through 2012. A similar 
refundable credit was extended to corporations by the 
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008. That 
credit will expire at the end of 2013.
Effects of Refundable Tax Credits 
Refundable tax credits, like other tax preferences, affect 
individuals and the economy in several ways. Economists 
generally evaluate the effects of taxes and tax preferences 
according to three criteria:
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18. The exchanges will group health plans into four tiers labeled 
“bronze,” “silver,” “gold,” and “platinum.” Each tier will cover a 
specified set of benefits, paying (on average) 60 percent, 70 per-
cent, 80 percent, or 90 percent, respectively, of a beneficiary’s 
claims. The reference premium is the cost of the silver plan with 
the second-lowest cost in the locality. For more information, see 
Congressional Budget Office, Additional Information About CBO’s 
Baseline Projections of Federal Subsidies for Health Insurance Pro-
vided Through Exchanges (May 2011), www.cbo.gov/publication/
41464.
19. Another development since 2008 was the creation of “bond cred-
its.” The prototype (and, with costs of $3 billion a year, the largest 
by far) was the Build America Bond program created by ARRA. 
Under that program, state and local governments receive direct 
payments from the federal government to reimburse them for the 
amounts they pay to holders of certain types of bonds. Although 
the credits are defined in the tax code as refundable, they are iden-
tical to other federal grants to state governments. For that reason, 
bond credits are not discussed in this report.
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 Economic efficiency—how taxes affect the allocation 
of resources in the economy; 
 Equity—how tax burdens are distributed among 
households that have varying demographic and 
economic characteristics; and
 Simplicity of the tax system—what the costs are of 
complying with and administering taxes.
Effects on Economic Efficiency
Refundable tax credits influence people’s decisions about 
whether to work, to purchase health insurance, to enroll 
in college, or even to adopt a child. In some cases, the 
credits reduce economic efficiency—the extent to which 
resources are allocated in a manner that maximizes their 
value—by shifting resources away from more productive 
activities toward less productive ones or by discouraging 
people from seeking work; in other instances, they boost 
efficiency by offsetting the work disincentives embedded 
in other tax provisions or in spending programs. 
By reducing the after-tax costs of particular goods and 
services, expenditure-based credits accomplish certain 
goals of lawmakers, but such credits can also contribute 
to an inefficient allocation of economic resources (by 
encouraging more consumption of goods receiving pref-
erential treatment or by subsidizing activities that would 
have taken place without the tax incentives). The tempo-
rary first-time homebuyer credit, for example, probably 
encouraged some people to buy a more expensive house 
than they would have otherwise. In some instances, 
people would have engaged in the tax-favored activity 
even without a credit. Therefore, allowing taxpayers to 
claim a credit results in a large loss of federal revenue rela-
tive to the increase in the subsidized activity. Such effects 
are not unique to refundable tax credits. Other types of 
tax preferences, such as the itemized deduction for mort-
gage interest, also encourage taxpayers to acquire more of 
those preferred items in some instances than they would 
have without the preferences.
Credits that are linked to earnings include some features 
that improve the allocation of resources and some that 
have the opposite effect. The EITC, for example, was 
designed to offset work disincentives caused by payroll 
taxes or by the income limits in public assistance 
programs delivered by government agencies other than 
the IRS. The credit encourages work in two ways: By 
raising the take-home pay of all recipients, the credit 
encourages people to enter the workforce, and by initially 
increasing as earnings rise, the credit boosts workers’ 
incentives to earn more.20 But to ensure that the credit 
targets people with low and moderate income, it begins 
to phase out as income rises above a certain threshold. 
For people in the phaseout range, that reduction in the 
amount of the credit generally provides an incentive to 
work less (see Figure 6).21
Researchers have found that the EITC, on net, effectively 
encourages work, especially among single mothers who 
previously were neither employed nor actively looking 
for a job. One study found that more than 60 percent 
of the increase of 9 percentage points in the employment 
of single mothers between 1984 and 1996 was due to 
expansions of the EITC over that period.22 Another study
20. That second feature of the credit—the increase in its value as 
earnings initially rise—also has the potential to reduce employees’ 
incentive to work: Employees may respond to the increase in their 
after-tax income by working less (a response that economists refer 
to as the income effect). Researchers, however, generally find that 
the substitution effect—the incentive to work harder as after-tax 
wages rise—has a greater impact than the income effect. See 
Robert McClelland and Shannon Mok, A Review of Recent 
Research on Labor Supply Elasticities, Congressional Budget 
Office Working Paper 2012-12 (October 2012), www.cbo.gov/
publication/43675. 
21. Other earnings-based credits have some or all of the same features 
as the EITC and thus also affect marginal tax rates. The child tax 
credit, for example, increases as earnings rise, up to the maximum 
of $1,000 per child. Like the EITC, the child tax credit reduces 
marginal tax rates in its phase-in range. Also like the EITC, at 
higher income levels the child tax credit is gradually reduced, 
causing marginal tax rates to increase as the credit is phased out. 
The two credits, however, differ in the beginning points of the 
phase-in and phaseout ranges. Whereas the EITC begins to phase 
in with the first dollar of earnings, taxpayers do not receive any 
child tax credit until they have earned at least $3,000. Moreover, 
the EITC begins to phase out when income reaches $37,870 for a 
single parent with one child, but such a parent would be eligible 
to receive the maximum child tax credit until his or her income 
was more than $75,000. See Congressional Budget Office, Effec-
tive Marginal Tax Rates for Low- and Moderate-Income Workers 
(November 2012), www.cbo.gov/publication/43709.
22. See Bruce D. Meyer and Dan T. Rosenbaum, “Welfare, the 
Earned Income Tax Credit, and the Labor Supply of Single 
Mothers,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 116, no. 3 (2001), 
pp. 1063–1114, http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/116/3/
1063.abstract.
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Figure 6.
The Earned Income Tax Credit for a 
Single Parent with One Child, 2013
(Dollars)
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
concluded that the credit’s expansions during the 1990s 
might be the policies most responsible for the increase in 
employment and earnings among single mothers—even 
more than the substantial changes to public assistance 
programs at the federal and state levels that occurred 
during that decade.23 
Tax preferences, including deductions and refundable 
credits, could boost efficiency under other circumstances 
too. Certain activities, such as the work of charitable 
organizations, have widespread public benefits. However, 
people do not always place the appropriate value on those 
“external” benefits to society, and that can lead—under 
certain conditions—to a misallocation of resources that 
can be remedied, at least in part, by the availability of tax 
preferences. Some analysts have argued that a uniform 
refundable credit (one that has a flat amount, regardless 
of income) is preferable to other tax preferences (such as 
the itemized deduction for charitable contributions) if 
the purpose of the subsidy is to change behavior. That 
argument is strongest in cases in which low-income 
people are as likely to respond to the incentives as are 
those with higher income.24 
Effects on Equity
Refundable tax credits, like other tax preferences, affect 
the distribution of tax burdens among households with 
different income. In addition, credits targeted toward 
specific populations alter the relative tax burden of 
households who have the same before-tax income 
but who differ in other ways (such as the number of 
children in the household).
Refundable tax credits differ in the range of income over 
which eligibility extends. For example, people qualify for 
the EITC as soon as they receive a paycheck, but they 
become ineligible when their income exceeds a threshold 
that, in 2013, is as high as $51,567 (for a couple residing 
with three children). To claim the refundable portion of 
the child tax credit, parents must have at least $3,000 of 
earnings, but eligibility for that credit extends much 
higher up the income scale than does eligibility for the 
EITC. Married couples who have three children remain 
eligible for the child tax credit until their income reaches 
$170,000—over three times the cutoff for the EITC. 
Because of those different income tests, the distribution 
of credits among households varies. In 2012, households 
in the lowest income quintile received a greater share of 
the total EITC (51 percent) than of the child tax credit 
(22 percent), CBO estimates.25 Conversely, households in 
the top three income quintiles received a larger share of 
the child tax credit—48 percent of that credit compared 
with 20 percent of the EITC. 
Largely as a result of the recession and the related 
temporary refundable tax credits (the economic stimulus 
payments and the Making Work Pay credit), the average 
individual income tax rate, according to CBO estimates, 
has been negative in recent years among households in 
the bottom two income quintiles (that is, the bottom 
40 percent of the income distribution). People in those 
23. See Jeffrey Grogger, “The Effects of Time Limits, the EITC, 
and Other Policy Changes on Welfare Use, Work, and Income 
Among Female-Headed Families,” Review of Economics and 
Statistics, vol. 85, no. 2 (May 2003), pp. 394–408. 
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24. See Lily L. Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg Jr., and Peter R. Orszag, 
“Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax 
Credits,” Stanford Law Review, vol. 59, no. 23 (2006), pp. 23–76. 
25. Quintiles, or fifths, are created by ranking households by their 
before-tax income. Quintiles contain equal numbers of people. 
A household consists of the people who share a housing unit, 
regardless of their relationship. 
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quintiles have, on average, received payments from the 
government for tax credits rather than paying income 
taxes to the government.26 As the number and size of 
refundable tax credits increased, the average individual 
income tax rate became even more negative—going from 
-5.8 percent in 2007 to -9.3 percent in 2009 for the 
lowest quintile and, for the second quintile, from 
-0.1 percent to -2.6 percent.27 As the economy improves 
and certain refundable tax credits expire or are scaled 
back as scheduled, the average individual income tax rate 
for people in those quintiles will probably become less 
negative. (Including payroll and other types of taxes, the 
average federal tax rate for people in the bottom 40 per-
cent of the income distribution also declined over those 
three years, although it remained positive.)
Like many other tax preferences, refundable credits also 
affect the distribution of tax burdens among households 
who are similar in nearly all ways but who differ in some 
key respect. The child tax credit, for example, favors 
people with children over the childless. College students 
(or their parents) benefit from the American Opportunity 
Tax Credit, whereas households that have no students 
do not. The first-time homebuyer credit, available 
from 2008 through 2010, gave an advantage to people 
purchasing their first home that neither renters nor 
longer-term homeowners generally had.28 
Analysts differ, however, as to whether the varying effects 
of credits and other tax preferences on households are 
fair and appropriate. One view is that the credits reflect 
differences among people—even those with the same 
before-tax income—in their ability to pay the amount 
of taxes (including income, payroll, and excise taxes) they 
owe: In some cases, people have to purchase more of 
certain items that society views as necessities (because, for 
example, they have children who need food and shelter), 
or they incur additional expenses in order to earn income 
(if, for example, they have to purchase a uniform or bring 
their own tools for a job). According to that view, some 
refundable tax credits appropriately reduce the gap in 
after-tax resources between people who have such 
expenses and those who do not. Another perspective, 
however, is that households choose to spend their income 
differently and that the tax system should not favor those 
who spend their income on particular goods or services. 
Effects on Simplicity of the Tax System
Tax preferences—especially those that, like refundable 
credits, are targeted toward specific populations—make 
it more difficult and more costly for taxpayers to com-
pute their tax liabilities and for the IRS to administer 
the tax code. To determine whether they are eligible 
for refundable tax credits, taxpayers generally must read 
more instructions, fill out more tax forms, and make 
more computations than they otherwise would. And if 
they are eligible, they typically must obtain and maintain 
more records to support their position in the event the 
IRS requests additional documentation. 
Administering refundable tax credits also strains the 
limited resources the IRS has to provide services to tax-
payers and to enforce the tax code. The number of tax 
returns increases as people who do not have to file returns 
do so in order to claim benefits. Complicated rules for 
refundable tax credits increase the number of telephone 
calls to the IRS from confused taxpayers and contribute 
to the tax gap (the difference between the amount of 
taxes that should be paid in a timely fashion and the 
amount that is actually paid). Some taxpayers probably 
make errors because they do not understand the tax law, 
whereas others—perhaps sensing that complexity makes 
the tax code more difficult to enforce—intentionally 
misreport their income, family characteristics, and other 
information on their tax returns. 
Administrative Challenges in 
Providing Subsidies
Many refundable tax credits have been created to meet 
social policy goals by subsidizing living expenses or cer-
tain activities—for example, providing assistance to 
low-income families or encouraging people to attend 
college or buy health insurance. Such goals, however, 
26. Average tax rates are calculated by dividing federal tax liabilities by 
before-tax income, including benefits from social insurance and 
other government assistance programs.
27. See Congressional Budget Office, The Distribution of Household 
Income and Federal Taxes, 2008 and 2009 (July 2012), 
www.cbo.gov/publication/43373.
28. The Worker, Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act of 
2009 extended a scaled-back version of the first-time homebuyer 
credit to certain homebuyers who already owned a home and 
purchased a new home after November 6, 2009. To qualify, those 
homebuyers had to have lived in their home for five consecutive 
years during the eight years before closing on the new home. The 
first-time homebuyer credit—including the provision applying to 
some homeowners—expired on April 31, 2010, for most people.
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can also be achieved through spending programs. The 
choice between the two approaches hinges, in large part, 
on administrative considerations—particularly, which 
approach best achieves those goals at the lowest costs to 
the government and which imposes the least burden on 
people who are eligible for the subsidies and on the third 
parties that are asked to provide evidence in support of 
an applicant’s claim of eligibility. Delivering subsidies 
presents three challenges in that regard: 
 Providing the correct amount of assistance to eligible 
people;
 Providing assistance in a timely manner, when people 
need it most; and
 Ensuring compliance with the laws for determining 
eligibility and computing the credit amounts.
Failure to meet those challenges makes it more difficult or 
more expensive to achieve the subsidies’ policy goals. 
Reaching Eligible People
In certain respects, receiving benefits from the IRS is sim-
pler for people than receiving them through other federal 
and state agencies, which means that eligible people may 
be more likely to seek such benefits. Individuals assert 
their eligibility for refundable credits on tax returns, and 
the IRS verifies—to some extent—applicants’ statements 
with information reported separately by third parties 
(for example, the earnings that employers report to the 
IRS on W-2 forms). In contrast, other government agen-
cies have usually relied on more burdensome means to 
validate applicants’ claims, such as in-office meetings 
between applicants and caseworkers, up-front requests for 
documentation (such as pay stubs), and phone calls to 
employers and others to confirm applicants’ statements 
(which also alerts those third parties to the applicant’s 
need for assistance from the government). As a result, 
the application process is time-consuming and may be 
perceived as intrusive by the claimants. Those factors, 
and any additional stigma that applicants may associate 
with being in the program, tend to reduce participation. 
Studies of Medicaid and the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known as the Food 
Stamp program) show that participation declines as the 
complexity of the application process increases.29 
In response to those concerns, many benefit programs 
have adopted application processes with certain adminis-
trative features that are similar to those used in the tax 
system. Forty-one states allow individuals to complete 
and submit an application online for at least one of the 
following six programs: SNAP, the Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families (TANF) program, child care 
assistance, Medicaid, the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program, and general assistance.30 Two states (Delaware 
and Maryland) offer online applications for all six pro-
grams.31 And since 2010, students and their parents have 
been able to download information from their tax returns 
onto their applications for federal student aid. Access to 
computers, however, remains a hurdle for low-income 
applicants for those benefits: Over 40 percent of adults 
with income below $30,000—and nearly 60 percent 
of those without a high school diploma—did not use 
computers at all in 2010.32
Another advantage of the tax system is that many low-
income workers have ongoing dealings with the IRS 
that they do not have with the government agencies 
that administer other types of assistance programs. 
Most low-income workers—the segment of the low-
income population eligible for earnings-based credits 
such as the EITC and the refundable portion of the child 
tax credit—routinely file tax returns to receive refunds 
29. See Jennifer P. Stuber and others, Beyond Stigma: What Barriers 
Actually Affect the Decisions of Low-Income Families to Enroll in 
Medicaid? Issue Brief (George Washington University Medical 
Center, July 2000), http://sphhs.gwu.edu/departments/
healthpolicy/CHPR/downloads/beyond_stigma_no3.pdf; and 
Janet Currie and Jeffrey Grogger, “Explaining Recent Declines in 
Food Stamp Program Participation,” in Janet Rothenberg Pack 
and William G. Gale, eds., Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban 
Affairs: 2001 (2001), pp. 203–244, www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/
25058786.
30. General assistance programs are operated and funded by states. 
Those programs typically provide cash and in-kind benefits to 
people who are not eligible for federal programs, such as TANF.
31. See Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Online Services for Key 
Low-Income Benefit Programs: What States Provide Online with 
Respect to SNAP, TANF, Child Care Assistance, Medicaid, CHIP, 
and General Assistance (CBPP, updated May 31, 2012), 
www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1414.
32. Census Bureau, The 2012 Statistical Abstract, Table 1158, p. 725, 
www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1158.pdf.
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when amounts withheld from paychecks during the year 
have exceeded their income tax liability for that year.33
Those advantages probably help explain why the partici-
pation rate among workers eligible for the EITC is higher 
than that in other programs serving low-income workers. 
Researchers have found that about 75 percent of eligible 
tax-filing units (that is, individuals and married couples 
who report earnings) received the EITC in 2005.34 By 
comparison, only 58 percent of eligible households with 
earnings claimed SNAP benefits in fiscal year 2009.35 
Those advantages diminish, however, as the application 
process for a refundable tax credit increases in complexity. 
Take, for example, the health coverage tax credit, which 
helps cover the cost of health insurance purchased by 
workers who are eligible for trade adjustment assistance. 
Applicants do not receive such credits until they are certi-
fied by the Department of Labor as qualifying for trade 
adjustment assistance—a process that can take several 
months. They must then purchase health insurance 
before they can receive the credit. Participation by eligible 
individuals was initially very low but increased somewhat 
after ARRA raised the amount of the credit (from 
65 percent to 80 percent of premiums) and simplified 
the application process.36
Using the tax system to provide subsidies to low-income 
people has some disadvantages. Although the application 
process is streamlined compared with that for spending 
programs, rules to determine eligibility can be difficult 
to understand. Moreover, people who claim refundable 
tax credits are not assigned caseworkers to make those 
determinations for them, as occurs in many spending 
programs. The IRS provides some assistance to applicants 
(chiefly through phone centers and walk-in sites), but the 
decision about whether to use those services is up to the 
applicant. 
Outside organizations, with technical assistance from the 
IRS, also set up sites where low-income taxpayers can 
have their tax returns completed for free by volunteer 
preparers. Access to those sites is limited, however: In 
2011, about 12,500 volunteer tax preparation sites—in 
combination with IRS-financed sites providing subsi-
dized tax counseling for the elderly—prepared 3 million 
returns (about 2 percent of individual income tax returns 
filed that year).37 
The challenges arising from complexity are probably 
exacerbated by certain characteristics of the population 
toward whom refundable credits are targeted. Relative to 
the rest of the filing population, a higher proportion of 
low-income filers are likely to be high school dropouts or 
to be from countries in which English is not the main 
language.38 Most low-income filers rely on tax preparers 
to help them understand the rules and to complete their 
returns; in 2006, for example, 71 percent of filers who 
received the EITC paid a preparer, compared with 
57 percent of all other filers.39 
Use of the tax system also is not advantageous in reaching 
eligible people who are outside that system. Most low-
income workers file a tax return, but nearly all people 
33. See Joint Committee on Taxation, Overview of Past Tax Legislation 
Providing Fiscal Stimulus and Issues in Designing and Delivering a 
Cash Rebate to Individuals, JCX-4-08R (JCT, February 2008). 
34. See Dean Plueger, “Earned Income Tax Credit: Participation 
Rate for Tax Year 2005,” IRS Research Bulletin: Proceedings of the 
2009 IRS Research Conference, pp. 151–195. That rate increases to 
81 percent when computed solely for eligible workers who live 
with children and who receive a much larger credit than those 
who do not live with children.
35. See Joshua Leftin, Esa Eslami, and Mark Strayer, Trends in Supple-
mental Nutrition Assistance Program Participation Rates: Fiscal Years 
2002–2009 (report submitted by Mathematica Policy Research to 
the Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, 
August 2011). 
36. See Stan Dorn, Health Coverage Tax Credits: A Small Program 
Offering Large Policy Lessons (Urban Institute, February 2008), 
www.urban.org/publications/411608.html; and Government 
Accountability Office, Health Coverage Tax Credit: Participation 
and Administrative Costs, GAO-10-521R (April 30, 2010), 
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-521R. 
37. Internal Revenue Service, Internal Revenue Service Data Book, 
2011, Publication 55B (March 2012), Table 19, p. 47, 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/11databk.pdf.
38. Among people whose family income fell below 200 percent of the 
federal poverty guideline and who, the Census Bureau deter-
mined, filed a tax return for 2007, about 27 percent did not 
graduate from high school and 24 percent were born in a country 
in which English was not one of the primary languages. The 
corresponding figures for people in higher-income families were, 
respectively, 8 percent and 11 percent, according to CBO’s 
tabulations. (Those tabulations are based on data from the 
Current Population Survey, 2008 Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement.) 
39. CBO tabulations based on a public-use sample of tax returns from 
the Internal Revenue Service.
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who are not working and whose income is low do not file 
one.40 In most cases, those people are not required to file 
a return because their income is too low.41
Establishing outreach programs, providing help with 
completing applications, and simplifying eligibility rules 
are ways to increase participation in an assistance pro-
gram, whether it is administered by the IRS or another 
government agency. An alternative approach, which 
New Zealand has adopted for its Family Support pro-
gram, would be to build on the current patchwork of 
tax benefits and other types of cash and in-kind assistance 
(referred to as government transfers) and use two or more 
agencies to deliver the same benefit through different 
means: Eligible workers would receive refundable tax 
credits from the IRS, and everyone else who is entitled to 
the same benefit would apply through the other agencies 
that typically provide assistance to low-income people.42 
Timing of Payments
A second consideration is providing subsidies in a timely 
manner. Refundable tax credits are generally paid after 
people file their tax return, although eligibility is based 
on their earnings (in the case of the EITC) or their 
expenditures (in the case of education credits) in the 
preceding year. In contrast, many other types of subsidies 
are delivered more quickly by other agencies.
A tax credit meant to encourage a certain type of behavior 
is probably less effective when beneficiaries must wait 
a long time to receive the subsidy. For example, the 
American Opportunity Tax Credit is based on education 
expenses incurred in the tax year (the year in which 
taxable income is earned), but most people wait until the 
following year to file a tax return to claim those expenses 
(thus, if they pay tuition in 2012, they will not receive 
the benefit until 2013). Because of that lag, the credit is 
less effective in encouraging enrollment in higher educa-
tion than are other forms of financial aid that are paid 
when tuition bills are due.
Tax credits have been designed to be paid before tax 
returns are filed, but “advance payments” can be difficult 
to implement. From 1979 through 2010, workers could 
opt to receive advance payments of the EITC through 
their employer.43 Workers who did so would then com-
pute, on their tax return, the amount of the credit they 
should have received on the basis of their total income for 
the entire year. Taxpayers who received too little would 
get a payment of the remaining amount from the IRS; 
those who received too much would have to repay the 
excess to the IRS. As a result, a temporary decline in 
income during the year would not automatically make 
someone eligible for the credit (or, conversely, a tempo-
rary increase in income would not disqualify the person). 
In that way, advance payments were different from bene-
fits provided by spending programs that base eligibility 
on the claimant’s income at the time of application and 
do not make that person pay back benefits received earlier 
if his or her income rises during the year.
Experience with the advance EITC payments raised some 
concerns. A 2007 report by the Government Account-
ability Office (GAO) found that only 3 percent of eligible 
taxpayers opted to receive advance payments of the credit 
in each year from 2002 through 2004.44 One possible 
reason for the low participation is that workers were 
unaware of the advance payment option, but two separate 
studies did not find a sizable increase in participation in 
40. See Joint Committee on Taxation, Overview of Past Tax Legislation 
Providing Fiscal Stimulus and Issues in Designing and Delivering a 
Cash Rebate to Individuals, JCX-4-08R (February 2008).
41. Some people must file a tax return even if they do not owe any 
income tax—for example, because their gross income equals 
or exceeds the filing threshold (the sum of the taxpayer’s standard 
deduction and personal exemptions for themselves and, if mar-
ried, his or her spouse). That amount is roughly equal to 
80 percent of the federal poverty guideline. People must also 
file if they are self-employed and owe Social Security and 
Hospital Insurance payroll taxes under the Self-Employment 
Contributions Act.
42. Nick Johnson, “Working for Families” in New Zealand: Some Early 
Lessons (Fulbright New Zealand, 2005), www.fulbright.org.nz/
publications/2005-johnson/.
43. Employers, in turn, did not pay the IRS the full amount of 
income and payroll taxes that they withheld from their employees’ 
paychecks. In that way, the federal government compensated 
employers for the advance payments that they made to their 
workers. The Social Security and Medicare trust funds were not 
affected by that method of compensation.
44. Government Accountability Office, Advance Earned Income Tax 
Credit: Low Use and Small Dollars Paid Impede IRS’s Efforts to 
Reduce High Noncompliance, GAO-07-1110 (August 2007), 
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1110.
20 REFUNDABLE TAX CREDITS JANUARY 2013
CBO
response to outreach efforts by the IRS or employers.45 
Another possibility is that workers did not want to take 
the risk of owing money to the IRS at the end of the year. 
(Other possible explanations for the low participation 
rate are that workers did not want their employers to 
know they were eligible for the EITC, or that they viewed 
the delayed payment as a way to save money.) 
Another concern was the impact of advance payments on 
compliance. Advance payments increased the lag between 
the worker’s receipt of the credit and the IRS’s verification 
of eligibility. The 2007 GAO report found that many 
people who received advance payments did not file tax 
returns—thus avoiding (intentionally or unintentionally) 
the end-of-year reconciliation process that corrected for 
overpayments and underpayments of the credit during 
the year. In response to that concern, the 1993 reconcilia-
tion act limited the amount of the credit that could be 
received in advance to 60 percent of the amount payable 
to workers with one child. The option to receive an 
advance payment of the EITC was repealed in 2010. 
Since 2000, the IRS has used several other methods to 
pay refundable tax credits before tax returns are filed. 
One of the simplest approaches for recipients was used to 
deliver the economic stimulus payments that were paid in 
2008. The rules for determining eligibility and the credit 
amounts were based on information on the 2007 tax 
returns that had been filed in the first four months of 
2008. Most recipients did not have to provide additional 
information, and, as a result, the IRS began making 
payments in early May—less than three months after the 
enactment of the law providing for the stimulus pay-
ments and just over two weeks after the April 15 deadline 
for filing 2007 returns. 
That approach, however, was probably more costly for 
the federal government than the method used to disburse 
EITC advance payments: The IRS had to gear up to 
determine eligibility for roughly 130 million stimulus 
payments while still processing tax returns and then send 
out a second set of refunds for that year. Moreover, 
recipients did not have to repay any amount that they 
would not have received on the basis of their actual 
income and family characteristics in 2008. Another 
approach was implemented for advance payments of 
the health coverage tax credit. In that instance, the IRS 
turned to a private contractor to administer advance 
payments; establishing that system cost $40 million, 
and annual operating costs are about $15 million. 
When the premium assistance tax credit for health insur-
ance is implemented in 2014, recipients will have the 
option of requesting advance payments to pay premiums 
in a timely manner, but the process for doing so will 
differ in several ways from most of the earlier options for 
delivering advance payments: The advance payments of 
the premium assistance credit will be paid directly to the 
insurer on behalf of the subsidized individual; eligibility 
for those credits will be verified, to a limited extent, by 
government agencies before the credits are paid; and the 
amounts of overpayments that must be repaid will be 
limited for most people. A unique challenge, however, 
is that the taxpayers’ credit will generally be determined 
initially on the basis of their family’s composition and 
income as of two years before the subsidy is received; the 
amount of the credit will later be recomputed on the basis 
of the taxpayers’ characteristics in the year that the sub-
sidy is paid. As a result, some recipients may have to 
repay part or all of any overpayment if changes in their 
family’s composition and income affect their eligibility 
for the credit or its amount.
Compliance
A third consideration is the degree of compliance associ-
ated with benefits for people with low income. One 
advantage of refundable tax credits is that the IRS, unlike 
other agencies, has the capacity to confirm whether filers 
meet some of the eligibility criteria without requiring that 
they provide additional documentation. Wage income 
can be checked against the W-2s employers file with the 
IRS. Third parties also report other information, critical 
to determining eligibility, to the IRS. Colleges and uni-
versities, for example, report tuition payments of all 
students. Other government agencies share data—such 
as Social Security records—with the IRS, thus improving 
the tax agency’s ability to check other information that 
taxpayers report. 
Challenges arise, however, when independent reports 
from third parties are unavailable or incomplete. One 
notable challenge that affects the administration of the 
entire tax system is the misreporting of self-employment 
45. Internal Revenue Service, National Research Office, Advance 
Earned Income Tax Credit 1994 and 1997 Notice Study, A Report to 
Congress (August 1999); and Damon Jones, “Information, Prefer-
ences, and Public Benefit Participation: Experimental Evidence 
from the Advance EITC and 401(k) Savings,” American Economic 
Journal: Applied Economics, vol. 2, no. 2 (2010), pp. 147–163, 
www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/app.2.2.
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income, for which there is little or no independent 
information from individuals or entities other than the 
taxpayer.46 Other information that is difficult to verify is 
whether the taxpayer resides with a child for most of the 
year (a factor that affects eligibility for the EITC and cer-
tain other child-related tax benefits), whether a student 
actually bought the textbooks he or she claims as expenses 
on the tax return (which affects claims for the American 
Opportunity Tax Credit), and whether the taxpayer is 
buying a home for the first time (a key criterion for the 
now-expired first-time homebuyer credit).
Other agencies face similar challenges in administering 
assistance programs. One key difference between those 
agencies and the IRS, however, is that they can demand 
that applicants provide documentation supporting their 
claims before receiving benefits. Another is that the state 
agencies that administer SNAP sometimes face the risk of 
owing money to the federal government if their error 
rates for that program are excessive.47 
Overpayment rates (which are net of recoveries due to 
enforcement actions) are generally lower for spending 
programs that have direct contact with beneficiaries than 
for tax preferences, but the costs of operating those pro-
grams are generally higher than the amounts the IRS 
spends for administering refundable tax credits. For 
example, overpayment rates for SNAP are typically less 
than 5 percent, but the federal and state governments 
together spend about $7 billion a year to administer the 
program (which paid out about $75 billion in benefits 
in fiscal year 2011), just over half of which is used to 
assess eligibility and recertify recipients.48 By contrast, 
overpayment rates for the EITC are about 25 percent, 
but to administer those benefits, the IRS spends less than 
1 percent of the total costs of the EITC. CBO estimates 
that those costs will be $68 billion in 2013.49 
To improve compliance with the rules governing 
refundable tax credits, the IRS could adopt verification 
procedures similar to those used by other agencies and 
require that applicants provide documentation before 
credits are paid. The IRS tested that approach in a small-
scale pilot program between 2003 and 2005, requiring 
certain applicants for the EITC to provide documenta-
tion showing that their children lived with them for more 
than half the year (the residency test for children claimed 
by taxpayers for the EITC). Although the study found 
that certification reduced overpayments, the IRS also 
determined that obtaining documentation imposed bur-
dens on applicants and the providers of that information 
(such as schools). The IRS did not conduct a formal cost-
benefit analysis, and the agency has not implemented the 
certification requirement nationwide.50 
Other approaches to improving compliance would be 
more incremental, but each alternative has advantages 
and disadvantages. The IRS could be given more access 
to third-party data, but the effectiveness of that approach 
would be constrained by the availability of reliable infor-
mation and the limited resources the agency has to use 
those data. The Congress could grant the IRS more 
powers to enforce the law (allowing the IRS, for example, 
to deny the credit without first giving the taxpayer an 
opportunity to provide more proof of eligibility), but 
those powers might result in some loss of taxpayers’ 
rights.51 Another approach would be to provide more 
funding for the IRS’s enforcement activities; that 
46. See Internal Revenue Service, Tax Gap for Tax Year 2006: Over-
view (January 6, 2012), www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/
overview_tax_gap_2006.pdf.
47. The federal government can impose penalties on states whose 
error rates for SNAP benefits (including overpayments and 
underpayments) are 105 percent of the national average for two 
consecutive years. That penalty is set at 10 percent of the amount 
of the error in excess of 6 percent. In addition, performance 
bonuses are paid to states with the best and the most improved 
payment accuracy. 
48. See Congressional Budget Office, The Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (April 2012), www.cbo.gov/publication/43173.
49. See Office of Management and Budget, Office of Federal Financial 
Management Improper Payments Dataset, “Description of Data 
Elements Contained in Improper Payments Dataset,” 
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/financial/improper_payment_dataset/; 
and Internal Revenue Service, IRS Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC) Initiatives: Addendum to the Report on Qualifying 
Child Residency Certification, Filing Status, and Automated 
Underreporter Tests (2008), www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/poc_summary
_addendum_121708_final.pdf. 
50. See Internal Revenue Service, IRS Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC) Initiatives: Report on Qualifying Child Residency 
Certification, Filing Status, and Automated Underreporter Tests 
(2008).
51. The IRS must follow certain procedures if it observes a potential 
error on a tax return. In an audit, the taxpayer can delay payment 
of the disputed amount until a court has reviewed the matter. The 
IRS has been granted greater flexibility to automatically deny the 
EITC (and certain other tax preferences) when certain informa-
tion on the return—such as a child’s Social Security number—is 
either missing or invalid. Under those circumstances, the IRS can 
immediately deny payment of the credit before any refund is paid. 
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approach would entail an increase in government spend-
ing or offsetting cuts in other government programs, but 
it might reduce overpayments by amounts greater than 
the added spending. Finally, eligibility criteria could be 
simplified, although that approach might also raise the 
total costs of credits (if, for example, eligibility was 
expanded as a result of simplification). 
Budgetary Treatment of 
Refundable Tax Credits
The unique aspect of refundable tax credits—that the full 
amount of the credit can be paid even when the recipient 
has no tax liability—is reflected in their treatment in the 
federal budget: One portion of the credits is shown as a 
reduction in revenues and the other as an increase in 
outlays. That treatment raises questions regarding the 
transparency of refundable tax credits. Because only the 
outlay portion is shown separately in the federal budget, 
the full costs of refundable credits are not readily visible. 
A related issue is that the allocation of the costs between 
revenues and outlays is not consistent among credits. 
Both issues may affect lawmakers’ review and oversight 
of refundable tax credits. 
Transparency of Total Costs
Refundable tax credits—as well as certain income tax 
exclusions, deductions, and nonrefundable credits—are 
termed tax expenditures because they resemble govern-
ment spending programs by providing financial assistance 
to specific activities, entities, or groups of people. One 
concern about the budgetary treatment of tax expendi-
tures is that they mask the true extent of government 
activity. They have a significant impact on the budget 
because, in total, they reduce revenues by a sizable 
amount. Because they are shown in the budget as reduc-
ing revenues rather than as increasing spending, tax 
expenditures make the budget and the scope of the 
government’s activities appear smaller.52 Moreover, 
because tax expenditures are not readily identifiable in 
the budget—unlike spending programs, which appear 
in individual budget accounts—assessing their cost is 
more difficult.
Refundable tax credits are more transparent than other 
tax expenditures because a portion of their costs—the 
outlays—is identified in the budget in separate accounts. 
However, even that transparency is mitigated by the 
sensitivity of refundable credits to changes in other provi-
sions in the tax code. For instance, when tax rates are cut 
(with no changes to the amount of refundable tax credits 
or eligibility for them), the outlay portion of the costs of 
credits increases because people incur a smaller tax liabil-
ity before the credit is applied, but the total costs of the 
credit remain the same. For example, the American Tax-
payer Relief Act of 2012 made permanent the 10 percent 
rate bracket, which was scheduled to expire at the end 
of 2012. According to JCT, by reducing income tax lia-
bilities, that change will increase the outlay portion of 
refundable credits by $1 billion to $5 billion per year 
between 2013 and 2021; the portion of those credits 
used to offset tax liabilities will fall by about the same 
amount.53 But the budget will directly identify only the 
increase in outlays, which might create the erroneous 
impression that the total cost of the credits has grown.
The budgetary effects of refundable tax credits could be 
made more transparent by showing the full costs of the 
provision, including revenues and outlays. (The trans-
parency of other tax expenditures would also be improved 
by creating separate budget accounts for each provision.) 
Making all tax expenditures, including refundable tax 
credits, subject to periodic reauthorization (in the same 
manner as most spending programs and temporary tax 
provisions) would also increase their transparency and 
could lead to better oversight but would add complexity 
to the legislative process. 
Allocation of Costs Between Outlays and Revenues
How the revenue and outlay portions of refundable 
credits are measured varies among credits. In most cases, 
the revenue portion is limited to the amount of the 
credit that reduces income tax liabilities. However, for 
two of the largest credits—the EITC and, beginning in 
2014, the credit for health insurance purchased through 
the newly created exchanges—the Internal Revenue 
Code specifies that the amount shown as a reduction 
in revenues should encompass the amount of the credit 
sufficient to reduce not only income tax liabilities but 
also certain other liabilities reported on tax returns. The 
largest of those other liabilities are the Social Security 
52. See Donald Marron and Eric Toder, How Big Is the Federal 
Government? Tax Policy Center (March 26, 2012), 
www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?ID=412528. 
53. Taking into account the total effect on revenues and outlays, 
JCT estimates that permanent extension of the 10 percent rate 
will, on net, increase the deficit by roughly $40 billion a year 
between 2013 and 2021.
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and Hospital Insurance payroll taxes paid by the self-
employed under the Self-Employment Contributions 
Act, or SECA. Revenues recorded in the budget for 
those taxes are reduced to reflect the share of the credits 
allocated to them.54 
The costs of refundable tax credits could be allocated 
between revenues and outlays in the same manner for all 
refundable tax credits. One approach when measuring 
revenues and outlays would be to take into account only 
the amount by which credits offset individual income tax 
liabilities. If, for example, the EITC had been allocated 
in the same manner as the child tax credit in 2012 (that 
is, if the portion of the credit defined as offsetting tax 
liabilities had not included the offset to SECA taxes), 
the portion of the EITC’s costs recorded as outlays would 
have increased from 91 percent to 98 percent, and the 
portion that reduced revenues would have declined, 
correspondingly, from 9 percent to 2 percent, CBO 
estimates.
Another approach would be to shift more of the impact 
of the refundable credits to the revenue side of the bud-
get—by including the amount by which all such credits 
offset Social Security and Hospital Insurance taxes paid 
by employees and their employers under the Federal 
Insurance Contributions Act, or FICA.55 Reducing the 
revenues recorded in the budget for FICA taxes to reflect 
the impact of the refundable credits, in the same manner 
as the SECA offset, would have substantially changed 
the allocation of EITC costs between outlays and reve-
nues in 2012: CBO estimates that the outlay portion 
would have declined from 91 percent to 38 percent and 
that the reduction in revenues would have increased 
correspondingly, from 9 percent to 62 percent.
Both approaches would treat refundable credits in a 
more consistent manner, making comparisons of the 
allocation of outlays and revenues among the credits 
more straightforward. The second approach—consider-
ing the credits to be a reduction in FICA taxes—would 
also make the treatment of certain credits more consistent 
with the original rationale for those credits by showing 
the extent to which they help offset payroll taxes. How-
ever, that approach would be difficult to implement 
and could—in the absence of other changes to their 
budgetary treatment—further reduce the transparency 
of the credits. Because FICA taxes are not reported on 
individual income tax forms, determining the amount 
of each recipient’s credit that offsets that tax would be 
challenging.
54. That treatment, however, does not affect the amount of payroll 
taxes credited to the Social Security and Hospital Insurance trust 
funds. The trust funds are credited with the full amount of SECA 
taxes. 
55. The Social Security trust funds would be credited with the same 
amount of FICA taxes as under current law.
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Appendix: 
Description of Refundable Tax Credits
Since 1975, 13 refundable tax credits have been 
enacted. They are described in the following tables:
 Table A-1. Start Dates and Expiration Dates of 
Refundable Tax Credits
 Table A-2. Description of Earnings-Based Refundable 
Tax Credits, 2013 and 2014
 Table A-3. Description of Refundable Tax Credits 
That Are Expenditure-Based or Are Related to the 
Alternative Minimum Tax, 2013 and 2014
 Table A-4. Description of Refundable Tax Credits 
That Expired Before 2013
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Table A-1. 
Start Dates and Expiration Dates of Refundable Tax Credits
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Note: COBRA = Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act.
a. The start date is the first year that the credit was refundable. Some credits were available earlier but were nonrefundable at that time.
b. October 1, 2010, if the purchase contract was in place as of May 1; or May 31, 2011, for certain overseas military personnel.
c. The credit is available for 15 months for workers who were involuntarily terminated on or before May 31, 2010.
d. After December 31, 2017, the credit is scheduled to revert to the nonrefundable Hope credit.
e. A nonrefundable credit for adoption expenses is still available after 2011.
f. After December 31, 2012, the prior-year alternative minimum tax credit for individuals reverted to nonrefundable status.
g. The original legislation also allowed corporations to claim a refundable research credit under certain circumstances. That provision 
expired on December 31, 2009.
Credit Start Datea Expiration Date
                     Earnings-Based Credits
Earned Income Tax Credit January 1, 1975 None
Child Tax Credit January 1, 1998 None
Economic Stimulus Payments January 1, 2008 December 31, 2008
Making Work Pay Credit January 1, 2009 December 31, 2010
                  Expenditure-Based Credits
Health Coverage Tax Credit December 1, 2002 December 31, 2013
First-Time Homebuyer Credit April 9, 2008 April 30, 2010b
COBRA Premium Assistance Credit September 1, 2008 May 31, 2010c 
American Opportunity Tax Credit January 1, 2009 December 31, 2017d
Adoption Tax Credit January 1, 2010 December 31, 2011e
Small Business Health Care Tax Credit January 1, 2010 None
Premium Assistance Tax Credit January 1, 2014 None
                          Other Credits
Prior-Year Alternative Minimum Tax Credit—Individuals January 1, 2007 December 31, 2012f
Prior-Year Alternative Minimum Tax Credit—Corporations April 1, 2008 December 31, 2013g
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Table A-2. 
Description of Earnings-Based Refundable Tax Credits, 2013 and 2014
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Year Description
Earned Income Tax Credit
2013 Reduces taxes of low- and moderate-income workers and provides cash assistance to those who owe little or no income tax.
Initially increases with earnings. The size of the credit varies with the number of children residing with the taxpayer, filing 
status (marital status), earnings, and adjusted gross income. Qualifying children generally must be under the age of 19, but the 
credit is allowed for children who are either under the age of 24 and full-time students or any age and permanently and totally 
disabled.
The maximum amounts of the credit are $487 for taxpayers without children, $3,250 for taxpayers with one child, $5,372 for 
taxpayers with two children, and $6,044 for taxpayers with three or more children. (The credit amounts change each year with 
the price of goods and services, as measured by the consumer price index for all urban consumers.)
The credit begins to phase out when earnings (or adjusted gross income, if higher) are greater than $7,970 for taxpayers 
without children or $17,530 for taxpayers with children. Eligibility for the credit is cut off when income exceeds $14,340 for 
taxpayers without children, $37,870 for taxpayers with one child, $43,038 for taxpayers with two children, and $46,227 for 
taxpayers with three or more children. For married couples filing jointly, the cutoffs are extended by an additional $5,340. 
(Those income thresholds are also adjusted annually for inflation.)
2014 Same as 2013.
Child Tax Credit
2013 Reduces taxes of low- and moderate-income taxpayers with children under the age of 17 and provides cash assistance to 
workers who owe little or no income tax.
The child tax credit equals the smaller of taxpayers’ income tax liability before credits and the maximum credit amount 
($1,000 per child). However, workers with little or no tax liability before the credit are eligible for a refundable amount 
(referred to in the tax code as the “additional” child tax credit).
For each additional dollar of earnings above $3,000, the refundable portion of the credit rises by 15 cents until the credit 
reaches a maximum of $1,000 per child under the age of 17. 
Taxpayers with three or more children can choose another method to calculate the additional credit. Under that alternative, the 
credit equals the amount by which their share of payroll taxes exceeds the earned income tax credit. They can claim the larger 
of the credit amounts determined under the two alternative approaches.
The child tax credit begins to phase out when adjusted gross income (with some modifications) reaches $75,000 for a single 
filer or a head of household ($110,000 for a married couple filing jointly).
2014 Same as 2013.
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Table A-3. 
Description of Refundable Tax Credits That Are Expenditure-Based or 
Are Related to the Alternative Minimum Tax, 2013 and 2014
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
a. The original legislation also allowed corporations to claim a refundable research credit under certain circumstances. That provision 
expired on December 31, 2009.
Year Description
Health Coverage Tax Credit
2013 Covers 72.5 percent of health insurance costs for households eligible for trade adjustment assistance (the federal program 
that provides income support, training, and employment services to workers affected by trade) or who have pension plans that 
have been taken over by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
2014 The tax credit expires.
American Opportunity Tax Credit 
2013 Covers up to $1,000 of payments made for tuition, certain fees, and course materials during the year. The credit is available for 
the first four years of postsecondary education. (The nonrefundable portion covers up to $2,500 of expenses.)
The credit is phased out when adjusted gross income (with some modifications) is between $80,000 and $90,000 for a single 
filer or a head of household (between $160,000 and $180,000 for a married couple filing jointly).
2014 Same as 2013.
Small Business Health Care Tax Credit
2013 Covers up to 35 percent (up to 25 percent for tax-exempt organizations, such as charities) of employers’ payments for their 
employees’ health insurance. Only tax-exempt organizations are eligible for the refundable portion, which cannot exceed the 
amount of payroll taxes paid by employers.
Eligibility is limited to employers who meet the following criteria:
• They have fewer than 25 full-time-equivalent employees, 
• They pay an average wage of less than $50,000 a year, and 
• They cover at least half of their employees’ health insurance premiums. 
The credit declines as the number of employees or the average wage increases.
2014 Maximum credit rate increases to 50 percent (35 percent for tax-exempt organizations).
Premium Assistance Tax Credit
2013 Not available.
2014 Subsidizes enrollment in certain health insurance plans through health insurance exchanges, which will be established to 
link people with insurance plans. The credit covers the difference between the reference premium for a locality and the 
household’s contribution, which is a specified percentage of income. That percentage ranges from 2.0 percent to 9.5 percent.
The exchanges will group health plans into four tiers (bronze, silver, gold, and platinum) that will cover a specified set of 
benefits, paying (on average) 60 percent, 70 percent, 80 percent, or 90 percent, respectively, of a beneficiary’s claim. The 
reference premium is the cost of the silver plan with the second-lowest cost in the locality.
People whose combined adjusted gross income, tax-exempt interest, nontaxable Social Security benefits, and other 
modifications are between 100 percent and 400 percent of the federal poverty guideline may be eligible for the credit. 
Generally, people who are eligible for employment-based plans, Medicare, or Medicaid will not be eligible for the credit. 
Prior-Year Alternative Minimum Tax Credit—Corporationsa
2013 Allows corporations the option of claiming alternative minimum tax credits that had not been used before 2006 rather than take 
bonus depreciation (a provision that allows corporations to accelerate deductions for the depreciation, or loss of value, of 
certain types of property).
2014 The tax credit expires.
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Table A-4. 
Description of Refundable Tax Credits That Expired Before 2013
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Note: COBRA = Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act.
Credit Description
Economic Stimulus Payments Provided a refundable portion of the credit to eligible filers with at least $3,000 in income from a 
combination of earnings and certain Social Security, Railroad Retirement, and veterans’ benefits. 
The refundable credit amount was set at $300 for a single filer or a head of household ($600 for a 
married couple filing jointly).
The nonrefundable portion of the credit was set at higher amounts (up to $1,200 for a married 
couple filing a joint return). Taxpayers could qualify for the nonrefundable portion even if they did 
not have any earnings.
The credit increased by $300 for each child under the age of 17.
Began to phase out when adjusted gross income (with modifications) was greater than $75,000 for 
a single filer or a head of household ($150,000 for a married couple filing jointly).
Making Work Pay Credit Set at the lesser of 6.2 percent of an individual’s earned income or $400 for a single filer or a head 
of household ($800 for a married couple filing jointly). 
Began to phase out when adjusted gross income was greater than $75,000 for a single filer or a 
head of household ($150,000 for a married couple filing jointly).
First-Time Homebuyer Credit Covered up to $8,000 ($7,500 for homes purchased in 2008) for first-time homebuyers. Beginning in 
November 2009, a smaller credit was available for people who already owned a home and had lived 
in their home for five consecutive years during the eight years before closing on a new home.
Began to phase out when adjusted gross income was greater than $125,000 for a single filer or a 
head of household ($225,000 for a married couple filing jointly).
Taxpayers who purchased a home in 2008 were required to begin repaying the credit amount to the 
federal government in 2010. Taxpayers who purchased a home in 2009 and 2010 must repay the 
credit if they sell the property within three years, convert the home entirely to a business or rental 
property, or—if the home is destroyed or condemned—do not buy a new primary home within two 
years of the event.
COBRA Premium Assistance Credit Covered 65 percent of health insurance premiums for workers who were involuntarily terminated 
between September 1, 2008, and May 31, 2010. The credit phased out as the taxpayer’s adjusted 
gross income (with modifications) rose above $125,000 for a single filer or a head of household 
($250,000 for a married couple filing jointly). The credit was available for up to 15 months.
Adoption Tax Credit In 2011, covered up to $13,360 of qualified expenses paid to adopt an eligible child. 
Began to phase out when adjusted gross income (with modifications) was higher than $185,210.
The credit is nonrefundable after 2011.
Prior-Year Alternative Minimum Tax 
Credit—Individuals
Allowed taxpayers to claim a credit for a portion of alternative minimum tax (AMT) liabilities 
in a prior year resulting from certain income that would not have been subject to the regular 
income tax.
The refundable credit was generally the greater of $5,000 and 50 percent of the unused 
nonrefundable minimum credit for the year. The refundable credit was reduced if adjusted gross 
income exceeded a specified threshold. The taxpayer could, instead, claim any unused AMT credit 
from the preceding year (that is, the amount that was denied in the preceding year because the 
taxpayer’s adjusted gross income exceeded the threshold, thus reducing the credit).
The credit is nonrefundable after 2012.
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